Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues: The Effects on Talent Distribution and Competitive Balance by Phillip Miller
†Phillip A. Miller, Department of Economics, Morris Hall 150, Minnesota State
University, Mankato, Mankato, MN 56001, E-mail: phillip.miller@mnsu.edu,  Phone: 507-389-
5248.
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 06-27
Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues: 





This paper uses a three-stage model of non-cooperative and cooperative bargaining in a
free agent market to analyze the effect of revenue sharing on the decision of teams to sign a free
agent.  We argue that in all subgame perfect Nash equilibria, the team with the highest
reservation price will get the player.  We argue that revenue sharing will not alter the outcome of
the game unless the proportion taken from high revenue teams is sufficiently high.  We also
argue that a revenue sharing system that rewards quality low-revenue teams can alter the
outcome of the game while requiring a lower proportion to be taken from high revenue teams. 
We also argue that the revenue sharing systems can improve competitive balance by
redistributing pivotal marginal players among teams.
JEL Classification Codes: C7, J3, J4, L83
Keywords: competitive balance, revenue sharing, sports labor markets, free agency
* I thank Dave Mandy, Peter Mueser, Ken Troske, Mike Podgursky, Jeff Owen, and two
anonymous referees for valuable comments on earlier drafts.  Their suggestions substantially
improved the paper.  Any remaining errors or omissions are my own.   3
1.  Introduction 
 
Free agency has been cheered by players and agents but has been scorned by team 
owners.  Player salaries under free agency have expanded to an extent that many fans 
believe small market teams now have difficulty in competing for playing talent and on 
the playing field, worsening the competitive balance between teams.    
Under free agency, individual players own the rights to their talent while under a 
reserve clause, teams own the right to a player’s talent.  Consequently, replacing a 
reserve clause with free agency effectively reassigns property rights to talent from teams 
to players.  In his seminal article on the baseball players’ labor market, Rottenberg (1956) 
argued that the distribution of playing talent among teams would not be affected by such 
a reassignment.  Under free agency, the team that acquires a player must compensate him 
in order to gain his services.  Under the reserve clause, interested teams can acquire a 
player via a cash sale or a trade, but the trading team, instead of the player, obtains the 
compensation.  In either case a given player would still play for the team that valued him 
the most, leaving competitive balance unchanged.  The redistribution of property rights to 
playing talent from teams to players merely shifts compensation from trading teams to 
players.   
El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) argued that if teams in a sports league are profit-
maximizers, all teams must have similar revenue functions
1 if it were to trend toward 
perfect competitive balance
2.  This implies that equalizing revenue functions could 
improve competitive balance.     4
If teams maximize profits and fans only care about the relative quality of the 
team, then revenue sharing in which revenue is shifted from high revenue teams to low 
revenue teams will not improve competitive balance (for example, see Rottenberg (1956), 
El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Rascher (1997), and Fort and Quirk (1995)).  If teams 
maximize profits but fans care about the relative and absolute quality of a given team, 
then revenue sharing can improve competitive balance (Marburger, 1997).  Furthermore, 
if teams maximize utility (for example, a team owner receives consumption value 
through the quality of the team), then revenue sharing can improve competitive balance 
(Rascher (1997) and Késenne (2000)).  Consequently, the impact of revenue sharing on 
competitive balance depends on the objectives of teams and the factors that matter to 
fans.   
This paper explores the workings of a revenue sharing system in a free agent 
market in a professional sports league.  We develop a bargaining game that blends non-
cooperative bargaining and cooperative bargaining to describe the market for free agents 
in a professional sports league with no revenue sharing.  The results suggest that a given 
free agent will sign with the team that has the highest reservation price for him.  Thus, in 
the spirit of El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971), a revenue-sharing system that can alter 
reservation prices sufficiently can alter competitive balance. 
We then modify the free agent model to explore how revenue sharing affects the 
decision to sign a free agent.  In Major League Baseball and the National Football 
League, every team pays the same proportion of its locally-generated revenues into a 
central pool.  This is the type of revenue-sharing system examined in papers by El-Hodiri 
and Quirk (1971), Rascher (1997), Fort and Quirk (1995), (Marburger, 1997), and   5
Késenne (2000).  Fort (2003) argues that if each team shares the same proportion of its 
revenues, the distribution of talent and the degree of competitive balance will remain 
unchanged.  In the context of the game developed in the present paper, such a revenue 
sharing system will decrease the reservation prices of all teams, both high revenue teams 
and low revenue teams.   
In contrast, similar to a progressive income tax, we allow for a higher proportion 
of revenue to be taken from “high revenue” teams than from “low revenue” teams.  In 
general, this type of revenue sharing forces the reservation price of high revenue teams 
down farther than it will decrease the reservation prices of low revenue teams.  If the 
proportion of revenue taken from high revenue teams is high enough, a free agent who 
would have signed with a high revenue team will sign with the low revenue team instead.   
Another issue that has received some attention is the incentives for revenue-
receiving teams to spend some of the shared revenue on player acquisition or 
development.  The 2003-2006 Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(MLB-CBA) includes wording specifically stating that shared revenue should be used to 
improve the quality of revenue-receiving teams.  If shared revenue is not used for these 
purposes, the offending club must answer to the commissioner (page 106).  Whether this 
threat is sufficiently credible to lead revenue-receiving clubs to spend these funds on 
their teams is debatable.  We argue that a revenue-sharing system can be arranged to give 
revenue receiving teams an incentive to spend shared revenues on their clubs without the 
sort of threat stated in the MLB-CBA.    To this end, we modify the revenue-sharing 
system to tie the amount of revenue received to the quality of the team.  This 
modification increases the reservation price of the low revenue team and would thus   6
cause that team’s reservation price to be increasing in the proportion of revenue shared 
by the high-revenue team.  Moreover, we argue that the proportion of revenue required to 
be taken from high revenue teams will be smaller if the proportion of revenue received 
by quality low revenue teams increases.  Consequently, this type of revenue sharing 
system is more palatable to high-revenue teams.  
The paper is organized as follows:  section 2 presents the free agent theory and 
summarizes its key results; section 3 presents a discussion of how revenue sharing 
between high and low revenue teams affects the decision to sign a free agent; section 4 
discusses and concludes.  We now move to a formal description of the free agent 
bargaining model. 
 
2.  The Free Agent Theory 
 
The following hypothetical example approximates the bargaining that occurs in a 
free agent market and sets the stage for the theory developed below.  Consider a process 
in which teams make initial offers to a free agent.  The free agent would prefer to sign 
with the team gave him the highest offer but he may not take it outright.  Suppose that the 
free agent will generate total benefits of $5,000,000 to the team that gave him the highest 
offer and suppose the team offers him $3,000,000 in salary. This leaves a surplus of 
$2,000,000 if the player signs.  Suppose that the team’s next-best alternative is some 
player who will provide it with a surplus of $500,000.  The substitute player may be 
another free agent, a player in the team’s minor league system, or a player available from 
another team.  In any case, by signing the free agent, the team will receive a net surplus   7
of $1,500,000.  If the free agent does not sign with the team for its initial offer, it will not 
attain this net surplus.  Since the team is better off with the free agent, he has some hold-
up power over the team and, consequently, has some bargaining power with which to 
acquire some of the net surplus.   
The example involves a multi-stage game in which teams make non-cooperative 
bids to the free agent.  He subsequently chooses to either sign for one of the initial bids or 
bargain with a particular team over a net surplus.  We attempt to capture the spirit of this 




Consider a two-team league with teams 1 and 2.  Let the free agent have 
preferences represented by the utility function  () . U p
3 and let the teams have preferences 
given by  () .
1 U  and  () .
2 U .  For generality, we assume that all utility functions are 
strictly increasing.  Let the free agent earn team i = 1,2 gross benefits of  i B . These 
benefits include ticket revenue, local media revenue, parking revenue, etc.  If the team’s 
owner gets utility directly from the talent on a team, then the talent level would be a 
component of these benefits.  If team i signs the free agent at some wage,  i w , the team 
receives a surplus of i i w B − .  If team i is unable to sign the free agent, then it will sign its 
next-best alternative, a substitute player who will generate a surplus of i s .  This substitute 
player may be another free agent.   i s  and  i B  are assumed to be exogenous.  Note that  i s  
is the difference between the gross benefits generated by the substitute player for team i   8
and his salary.  For simplicity, assume that there is no shared revenue at this point.  
Hence,  i B  represent all the benefits generated locally by the free agent and his substitute 
for team i.  Note that the benefits generated by a player will be dependent upon the 
amount of talent possessed by the player.  For simplicity in notation, we suppress this 
dependence in the current section.  In section 3, we make the dependence explicit. 
Team i’s reservation price for the free agent,    i w , is that wage where 
( ) ( ) s U w B U i i i i i = − .  Since  i U  is strictly increasing,  s B w i i i − = .  Let the free agent 
have an exogenous reservation wage of    r w .  This reservation wage is the highest wage 
that he could make outside the league if he, for example, sold insurance or operated a 
restaurant.  Let the reservation prices of the teams and the free agent’s reservation wage 
be ordered    1 w > 2 w > r w .  For simplicity, we assume that both teams and the free 
agent are perfectly-informed about one-another.  While this assumption may not be 
exactly observed in practice, players and teams would find it in their interests to acquire 
accurate information about each other.  The team will pay a free agent several hundreds 
of thousands of dollars.  It will want to gather as much information on the player’s 
proneness to injury, ability to get along with teammates, etc.  Conversely, the player 
expects to be with a team for a year or more and will want to ensure that he will know as 
much about the team as possible.  Will he get along with the manager?  Is the team 
serious about winning a championship?  Will he get along with his teammates?  
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume a given player and interested teams are 
perfectly-informed about each other regarding the value teams have for the player and 
what the player will generate for each team.   9
The game proceeds in three stages.  In stage one, the teams make non-cooperative 
bids    i
o w ≤ i w  to the free agent
4.  The initial bids can be conceived as indicators of 
which teams are interested in the free agent.  Assume that the bid a particular team makes 
in the first stage commits it to sign the free agent for at least that amount.  In stage two, 
the free agent chooses to either bargain cooperatively with one of the two teams or to 
sign outright with one of them for its initial bid.   
If the free agent chooses to bargain cooperatively with one of the two teams but 
does not reach an agreement, then the game proceeds to a third stage.  In the third stage, 
the free agent can choose to either bargain cooperatively with the other team or sign 
outright with that team for its initial offer.  For convenience we assume that if the free 
agent is indifferent between two outcomes at equal stages of the game, he will choose 
that outcome associated with the team with the highest reservation price.  If he is 
indifferent between bargaining (or signing outright) with a given team in stage two and 
bargaining (or signing outright) with that team in stage three, we assume he will choose 
to bargain in stage two.  We will also assume that if the free agent is indifferent between 
signing with a team outright or bargaining with that team in stage two or three, he will 
sign outright.  If the free agent is indifferent between signing for a team’s initial bid in 
stage two and stage three, he will sign in stage two. 
We also assume that no renegotiation is allowed:  once a free agent chooses to 
bargain with a particular team, he cannot reopen negotiations with that team should 
negotiations with the other team fail, nor can he sign with that team for its initial bid.  
This is a simplifying assumption made to allow the use of backwards induction in the 
analysis, but we do see examples of this happening in actual negotiations.  For example,   10
the Cleveland Indians negotiated with free agent closer Ugueth Urbina during spring 
training of 2004.  Urbina wanted to receive more than what the Indians wanted to pay 
him.  The Indians thought that Urbina was not in physical shape to play, and they felt it 
would take several additional weeks for him to get into playing shape.  Without any 
financial concession by Urbina, the Indians would not accept a deal (Hill, 2004).  
Negotiations broke down and Urbina eventually signed with the Detroit Tigers. 
We now present a formal description of the game’s stages and we summarize the 
analytical results.  Since we use backwards induction to solve the model, we present the 




Suppose that in stage two, the free agent has initially chosen to bargain with team 
j≠i but could not arrive at an agreement with it.  In this stage, the free agent chooses to 
either bargain with team i or to sign outright for its initial offer.  Regardless of what he 
chooses, team j will receive    j s .  Let  i w  denote the salary that the free agent receives in 
the second stage from cooperatively bargaining with team i.  Following Nash, we assume 
that the player and the team will want to end up on the Pareto frontier bounded by their 
respective reservation prices.  A reasonable bargain on that frontier is a point at which 
the relative loss suffered by one negotiator as a result of a move from that point exceeds 
the relative gain enjoyed by the other from such a move.  This implies the optimal point 
to be that at which the product of the negotiators’ utility functions is maximized.  More 
generally, the utilities may be net of the utilities evaluated at the disagreement outcomes.    11
Hence the free agent and the team will choose that wage that maximizes the product of 
the differences in the utilities:  
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] s U w B U w U w U i i i i i r p i p − − − .                                                       (1) 
Differentiating (1) with respect to  i w  yields the first-order condition 
( ) ( ) () [ ]







w U w U w B U
s U w B U w U
r p i p i i i
i i i i i i p
.                                                                      (2) 
Where 
*
i w  is referred to as the Nash Solution.  Note that in every non-disagreement 
solution       r w ≤ i
* w ≤ i w .  For convenience we will assume that if one of the equalities 
holds (they cannot both hold since    r w < i w ), the Nash solution will be the outcome of 
the negotiations.  Note that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied with 
the given assumptions.  Therefore, (2) implicitly defines the function 
      i
* w = i w r w , i s () .  Standard comparative statics analysis reveals that       i
* w  is 
increasing in    r w  and decreasing in    i s .   
If the free agent chooses not to bargain cooperatively with team i in the third 
stage his only remaining alternative is to sign with that team for its initial bid.  In this 
case the player receives    i
o w , team i receives  w B
o




In stage one, teams 1 and 2 made initial bids of w
o
1  and w
o
2 respectively to the 
player.  In stage two, the player chooses to bargain with one of the two teams or chooses   12
to sign with one of the teams for its initial bid.  Suppose the player has chosen to 
cooperatively bargain with team j ≠ i .  Recall that once the player makes such a choice, 
he cannot sign with team j for its initial offer and he forgoes the option of cooperatively 
bargaining with team j in the third round should negotiations fail in the second round.  He 
still has the option of cooperatively bargaining in the third stage with team i for a salary 
of       i
* w = i w r w , i s ()  or signing with that team for its initial bid.   Let  j w  denote the 
salary that the free agent receives in the second stage from cooperatively bargaining with 
team j.  Following Nash, we assume that the player and the team will want to end up on 
the Pareto frontier bounded by their respective reservation prices.  Hence, the player and 
the team will choose that wage that maximizes the product of the differences in the 
utilities: 
( ) () [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] s U w B U w s w w U w U j j j j j
o
i i r i p j p − − − , , max .                                            (3) 
Maximizing over wj yields the first-order condition 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]








w s w w U w U w B U
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o
i i r i p j p j j j
j j j j j j p
.                                      (4) 
Note that in every non-disagreement solution      max i w r w , i s ( ) , i
o w [ ] ≤ j
* w ≤ j w  
and the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied with the given assumptions.  
Therefore, (4) implicitly defines the function 
   
j
* w = j w max i w r w , i s ( ) , i
o w [ ] , j s ( ).  
Standard comparative statics analysis reveals that      j
* w  is increasing in 
      max i w r w , i s () , i
o w [ ]  and decreasing in    j s .     13
If the free agent chooses not to bargain cooperatively with team j in the second 
stage he can choose to sign with team  j i ≠  in the second stage for its initial bid.  In this 
case the player receives w
o
i , team i receives  w B
o
i i − , and team  i j ≠  receives s j. 
 
Stage One and the Summary of the Outcome 
 
In the first stage, the teams make closed bids which they give to the free agent in 
the second stage.  The player has no move in stage one.  Since teams are choosing their 
bids and since they cannot legally collude with one-another in the free agent market, we 
assume the bids are chosen non-cooperatively.  Since each team must pay its initial bid to 
the player if he accepts it, a strategy of team i in the first stage is a bid,    i
o w , such that 
i
o w ≤ i w .  Each team makes its bid to maximize its utility from proceeding to the second 
and third stages.   
The details of the equilibrium analysis are given in Appendix 1.  Summarizing, 
there are four subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solutions to the free agent game.  In 
each equilibrium, the team with the highest reservation price, team 1, gets the free agent.  
Depending on the levels of the initial offers, the free agent will either sign for team 1’s 
initial offer or he will choose to bargain cooperatively with team 1.  The non-uniqueness 
of a solution results from the structure of the game - interested teams make initial bids to 
the free agent who then decides to either take that offer or bargain with the highest-
bidding team.     14
Team 1 always gets the free agent because it can always outbid team 2 for his 
services.  Team 1 can set its initial offer anywhere around the reservation price of team 2.  
If team 1’s offer is above team 2’s reservation price, it ensures itself that the free agent 
will not sign with team 2.  If team 1 sets its initial bid below the reservation price of team 
2 but sets it high enough so that the wage the free agent can get by cooperatively 
bargaining with it is no lower than any possible initial bid or any cooperative outcome 
with team 2, then team 1 will get the free agent.  Consequently, team 1 can always outbid 
team 2 in the sense that the free agent can do no better than signing with team 1.   
This result is essentially the same as that described by Rottenberg (1956).  It is 
also essentially the same as that described by Quirk and Fort (1999), but with a minor 
adjustment.  Quirk and Fort argued that the free agent will be paid somewhere between 





2, the low-revenue team’s initial bid, binds that team to pay him at 
least that amount.   
Tables 1, 2, and 3 present a list of free agents who were active in the 2004-2005 
Major League Baseball free agent market and for who reliable substitute information was 
available
5.  The list of free agents and their potential substitutes was gathered from 
various internet sources, including news stories on the official website of Major League 
Baseball and the Official Website of ESPN.  Each free agent listed is a player who has 
signed a new contract on or before December 13
th, 2004 – the end of the Winter 
Meetings.  The table also contains potential substitute information.  It also contains the 
contract length of each free agent as well as salary information of the potential 
substitutes.  For substitutes who were also free agents and who signed contracts on or   15
before December 15
th, 2004, we include the contract length as well as the average salary 
during the new contract.  For substitutes who were either not free agents or who were 
free agents but did not sign new contracts, the salary given is that player’s 2004 salary 
obtained from USAToday.com.  The average salaries do not include signing bonuses.  
The tables also provide productivity statistics for the 2004 season obtained from 
ESPN.com.  For position players, we provide offensive and defensive statistics.  For 
pitchers, we provide pitching statistics only.  Each table provides the definition of the 
offensive and defensive productivity measures.  Table 1 provides information of free 
agent position players, Table 2 provides information on relief pitchers, and Table 3 
provides information on starting pitchers. 
[Tables 1, 2, and 3 should be placed here] 
Nomar Garciaparra came to the Cubs in 2004 in a midseason trade with the 
Boston Red Sox and was quickly accepted by his new teammates and the Cubs fans.  
After the season, Garciaparra, a shortstop, was on the market along with shortstops Edgar 
Renteria and Orlando Cabrera.  Garciaparra signed a 1-year, $8 million contract with the 
Cubs.  Renteria signed a 4-year $40 million contract with the Boston Red Sox, paying 
him, on average, $2,000,000 more than Garciaparra will earn with the Cubs.  Even 
though Garciaparra was injured for a good portion of the 2004 season, he had a higher 
OPS (on-base plus slugging percentage, a commonly-used measure of offensive prowess) 
than either Cabrera or Renteria.  This was somewhat offset by Garciaparra’s lower range 
factor and zone ratio, measures of defensive productivity.  The Cubs likely believe that 
the surplus that Garciaparra will provide is larger than what either Renteria or Cabrera 
could provide and their decision to sign him is thus consistent with the theory.   16
Troy Glaus signed with the Arizona Diamondbacks.  Richie Sexson, the primary 
right-handed power hitter on the Arizona roster, signed a 4-year, $50 million contract 
with Seattle.  When Glaus was signed, indications were that he would not be back with 
Arizona, and this created a need for some right-handed power.  Consequently, Glaus was 
signed to replace Sexson in the lineup.  Both Glaus and Sexson were injured for most of 
2004, but when healthy, they both put up similar OPS’s.  Glaus’s average salary is 
slightly lower than Sexson’s suggesting that the Diamondbacks believe that Glaus will 
provide them with a higher surplus.  The signing of Glaus is also consistent with the 
theory.   
Jermaine Dye signed with the Chicago White Sox to replace Magglio Ordonez in 
the outfield.  Dye’s OPS was lower than Ordonez’s, but Ordonez’s 2005 salary will likely 
be much larger than Dye’s average salary of $5.075 million.  Consequently, Dye will 
likely not contribute as many wins to the White Sox as Ordonez would, but this will more 
than offset his lower salary.  The White Sox likely believe that Dye will provide a greater 
surplus than Ordonez, implying that Dye’s signing is consistent with the theory in the 
paper. 
Troy Percival signed a 2-year contract with the Detroit Tigers that will pay him an 
average of $6,000,000 per year.  His substitute, Esteban Yan, signed a 2 year, $2.25 
million contract with the Anaheim Angels.  While Percival’s average salary is higher 
than Yan’s, Percival was a more-effective pitcher in 2004.  He had more saves and saved 
a greater proportion of his opportunities.  He also had fewer walks and hits per nine 
innings.  The Tigers likely believe that Percival will generate a higher surplus than Yan, 
and Percival’s signing is consistent with the theory.   17
Kris Benson signed a 3-year $22.5 million contract with the New York Mets.  Al 
Leiter, a potential substitute for Benson, signed a 1-year contract with the Florida 
Marlins.  Benson is 9 years younger than Leiter, had more innings pitched, and slightly 
fewer walks and hits per nine innings.  But Benson had a slightly higher ERA.  The Mets 
probably believe that Benson will contribute more to their fortunes than Leiter, and 
Benson’s signing by the Mets is consistent with the theory. 
We now move to an examination of the effects of revenue sharing. 
 
3.  Revenue Sharing and the Distribution of Players 
 
In this section, we examine a revenue sharing system that takes a higher 
proportion from high revenue teams than from low revenue teams.   We remain within 
the confines of the free agent model described above, but with some minor modifications 
described below.   
We continue to consider a two-team league with teams 1 and 2.  For simplicity, 
let all benefits derived from having any player on a team be from revenue and let revenue 
be an explicit increasing function of player talent, measured in units of player talent “t”.  
The rationale for this is that the representative fan’s demand for baseball is an increasing 
and concave function of talent acquired by the team.  Hence,  ( ) t B B i i = .  We assume that 
a player’s talent level is exogenously determined.  Hence,  ( ) t Bi  is exogenously 
determined.  Let team 1 be the high revenue team.  Hence, for a given value of t, 
() () t t B B 2 1 > .   Also, assume that the free agent is more talented than his substitute for 
any team.  Hence, if the free agent has talent level  f t and his substitute has talent level   18
s t , then  ( ) () s f t B t B 1 1 > .  Initially assume there is no restriction on how teams spend the 
revenue they receive through revenue sharing. 
The proportion of revenues that are paid out in revenue sharing in MLB and the 
NFL are the same whether the team is a high revenue team or a low revenue team.  Fort 
(2003) argues that this sort of revenue sharing system will not alter the distribution of 
players nor will it alter competitive balance.  Suppose a fixed proportion γ ∈ 0,1 ()  of 
each unit of gross revenue is transferred from team 1 to team 2.  Hence, if the free agent 
signs with team 1, team 2 gets  ( ) f t B1 γ  and team 1 keeps ( ) ( ) f t B1 1 γ − .  This decreases 




1 1 − − = γ .   1
' s  is the after-
revenue-sharing surplus generated by the substitute player for team 1, given by 
() ( ) w B s s s t
1 1
'
1 1 − − = γ .   () s t B1  is the gross benefit generated by the substitute player 
for team 1 and ws1 is the salary paid to him by team 1.  Since γ , ws1 and ts are 
exogenous to the model,  () s t B1  and   1
' s  are also exogenous.   Lastly, under the above 
assumptions,  () () () 0 1 1
'
1 < − − =
∂
∂
s f t B t B
w
γ
.  Hence, increasing the sharing proportion will 
decrease team 1’s reservation price for the free agent. 
Note that the reservation price of team 2,  2 w , is unchanged because the shared 
revenue is not generated by the free agent should he play for team 2 and there is nothing 
tying the shared revenue to team 2’s reservation price for him.   Therefore, altering the 
proportion of revenue shared will not change team 2’s reservation price for the free 
agent.   19
The introduction of revenue sharing into the model does not alter the equilibrium 
analysis detailed in Appendix 1.  In each equilibrium described in the appendix, the 
general result is that the team with the highest reservation price gets the player.  Each 
equilibrium depends on the reservation prices of the teams which in turn depend on the 
utility functions being strictly increasing.  The introduction of revenue sharing will alter 
the reservation price of team 1, but does not change the general result that the team with 
the highest reservation price still gets the player.  The introduction may change which 
team has the highest reservation price. 
Suppose that γ  is set such that  1
' w > 2 w .  Although there is a continuum of 
solutions to the free agent bargaining game, the team with the highest reservation price 
always gets his services.  Hence, if γ  is set at this level, team 1 obtains the free agent and 
the distribution of talent (and thus competitive balance) is unaltered. 
Substituting for  1
' w  yields () ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] w w B B s s f t t
2 1 1 1 1 1 > − − − − γ γ .  Rearranging this 
expression yields the condition  
( )
() () () s f
s






− < γ .                                                                                          (5) 
Hence, if γ  is sufficiently small, the free agent will sign with team 1.   
The outcome of the game depends on the particulars of the situation:  the 
difference between team 2’s reservation price and the salary that team 1 pays its 
substitute player relative to the additional revenue that team 1 receives from signing the 
free agent instead of signing the substitute player.  Therefore, the model suggests that for 
revenue sharing to have the intended consequence of causing a high-revenue team to not 
sign a free agent it otherwise would, the proportion of revenue shared must be   20
sufficiently high.  If γ  were sufficiently high, then  1
' w < 2 w , and team 2 would get the 
free agent. 
We can separate the expression  ( )
() () () s f
s






−  into three possibilities.   First, 
if we have a very cheap substitute who provides high gross benefits to team 1 such that 









t B t B
w w
 and team 2 gets the free agent.  
Second, if the substitute is highly paid such that  0 1 2 < − s w w , then 
() () s f
s
t B t B
w w
1 1
1 2 1 1
−
−
− < < γ  and team 1 gets the free agent.  Third, if 








t B t B
w w
 , then team 2 will get the player as long as  
( )
() () () s f
s






− > γ .  In this case, γ is sufficiently high.  This will be the case if 
0 1 2 > − s w w  and  () ( ) s f s t B t B w w 1 1 1 2 − < − .   
This suggests that the factors that could cause γ  to be sufficiently high are a 
sufficiently low ws1, a sufficiently high  ( ) s t B1 , a sufficiently low  ( ) f t B1 , or a 
combination of any of these three characteristics.  Therefore, the better the substitute 
player (in terms the revenue he generates, the salary he is paid, or both), the more likely 
it will be that revenue sharing will have the intended consequences of redistributing 
talent.  Moreover, the lower the revenue-generating capability of the free agent, the more 
likely that revenue sharing will alter with which team the free agent will sign. 
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Built-in Incentives for Increasing the Reservation Prices of Low Revenue Teams 
 
Here we examine a revenue-sharing plan that effectively increases the reservation 
price of the next-best alternative team for the free agent.  The 2003-2006 MLB-CBA 
specifically states that “… each Club shall use its revenue sharing receipts… in an effort 
to improve its performance on the field.”  If it appears that receiving teams are not doing 
this, then “…the Commissioner may impose penalties on any Club that violates this 
obligation” (page 106).  Is this an effective way of forcing receiving teams to spend their 
shared revenues on players?  It essentially relies on a threat of some action imposed by 
the commissioner, and whether that threat is credible is open to debate.  However, the 
revenue-sharing system described above can be altered so that teams that receive revenue 
will make their decision whether to sign a free agent based on the amount of revenue that 
they will receive through sharing.  They will do so without the sort of threat contained in 
the current MLB-CBA. 
Suppose that  2 1 w w >  with no revenue sharing.  As argued above, an increase in 
the proportion of revenue taken away from the high-revenue teams may not cause  1 w  to 
fall far enough, in which case, a given free agent will still sign with team 1.  Thus, to 
improve competitive balance, a relatively large proportion of revenue must be taken from 
high revenue teams. 
Recall that, by definition, team 2’s reservation price for the free agent is given by 
2 2 2 s B w − = .    2 B  represents the benefits to team 2 generated by the free agent and  2 s  is 
the surplus that it obtains by signing its next-best alternative player:   2 2 2 s s w B s − =    22
where  2 s B  represents the benefits generated by the substitute and  2 s w  is his salary.  
Hence if shared revenue can increase  2 w  “enough”, this, along with revenue sharing 
decreasing  1 w  will have the intended consequence of changing team 1’s and team 2’s 
reservation prices so that  2 1 w w <  and the player will end up with team 2. 
Recall that a proportion of team 1’s revenue, γ, is paid out in the revenue-sharing 
plan.  Suppose that the high revenue team generates total revenue of R.  Therefore, the 
total amount paid out by team 1 in this plan is γR.  Now, suppose that a proportion of this 
revenue is paid out to the low revenue team while the rest is kept in some fund that does 
not reach the low-revenue team (e.g. a league slush fund).  Suppose that this proportion is 
increasing in the quality of the team.  Let there be two types of team 2, “good” and 
“bad”.  A “good” team is one that performs relatively well on the field.  Let the 
proportion of total revenue received by “good” team 2 be  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ Ωg while  () 1 , 0 ∈ Ωb is 
received if the team performs poorly.  Since teams are assumed to be rewarded in this 
system, Ωg > Ωb Thus, if the team performs well, it will receive ΩgγR from the revenue 
sharing system and, if it performs poorly, ΩbγR.   R R b g γ γ Ω − Ω is the total premium paid 
to the low revenue team if it is a quality team. 
Team 2’s reservation price for the free agent becomes 
2 2 2' s R B w g − Ω + = γ  where  2 2 2 s b s w R B s − Ω + = γ .  Substituting for  2 s and collecting 
terms yields 
() () 2 2 2 2' s b g s w R P P w + Ω − Ω + − = γ .                                                                           (6)   23









:  the greater the difference 
between the gross revenue generated by the free agent and his substitute, the higher the 






.  Hence, the higher the proportion given to 
“good” low-revenue teams, the higher the reservation price of team 2 will be.   ' 2 w  is also 
an increasing function of γ because this sort of revenue sharing system forces the low-
revenue team to include the benefits received from revenue sharing in the decision to 
sign the free agent.  In short, the commissioner’s office does not need to put resources 
into monitoring teams to ensure higher rates of compliance with the goals of the revenue 
sharing system.  Teams monitor themselves. 
The corollary is that since the proportion received by a good team 2 increases, a 
smaller proportion of total revenue paid out by team 1 is required to reverse the 
inequality between their reservation prices.  This type of revenue-sharing system would 
be more palatable to the high revenue teams.  Recall that El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971) 
argued that absolute competitive balance (i.e. the probability of any team winning any 
given game is 50%) will only occur if all teams have similar revenue functions.  One way 
to approach this condition is to equalize reservations prices.   
Lastly whether teams were subject to the sort of revenue sharing system described 
above, players such as Wayne Gretzky, Joe Greene, Michael Jordan, and Ernie Banks 
would likely still have played for the same teams.  These star players had high revenue-
generating capabilities and had few good substitutes, and the theory suggests that   24
revenue sharing would have had little impact on where these sorts of star players would 
have played.   
Revenue sharing will have the largest impact on competitive balance through the 
market for “marginal players” – those players who are not stars, but who are solid and 
productive players.  Compared to the stars, these marginal players have lower revenue-
generating capabilities and have more close substitutes available.  Consequently, revenue 
sharing systems are more likely to redistribute these types of players between teams.  
These marginal players will include pivotal players – those players who can make the 
difference between being in contention and not being in contention.  Because the 
revenue-sharing systems described above would redistribute more of these pivotal 
players, the revenue sharing system described above can improve competitive balance. 
 
4.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the decision of a professional sports team to sign a free 
agent, giving particular attention to the operation of a revenue sharing agreement in such 
systems.  Unlike past analyses, we examine a system in which a larger proportion of 
revenue is taken from high-revenue teams.  A free agent will sign with that team with the 
highest reservation price for him, and in the absence of revenue sharing, that will be the 
high revenue team.  If there is revenue sharing, the decision of whether to sign this free 
agent will not be changed unless the proportion of revenue taken from the high revenue 
team is sufficiently high.  We also argue that in the absence of specific incentives, 
revenue received through revenue sharing by a low revenue team will not change its   25
reservation price for a given player because that revenue is not generated by the its 
players.  We also examine a system that rewards quality low-revenue teams.  Such a 
system would force low-revenue teams to account for revenue received through sharing 
in the objective function regarding a free agent.  Such a system would cause a 
redistribution of some talent while requiring a smaller proportion of revenue to be taken 
from high-revenue teams.  Both of these systems can improve competitive balance by 
redistributing pivotal marginal players. 
One measure that has been suggested in past labor negotiations in Major League 
Baseball was a decrease in the number of years of major league service a player must 
have before he can become a free agent.  Currently, that threshold is 6.   During the 1994-
1995 baseball players’ strike, team owners proposed to do away with baseball’s 
arbitration system in exchange for free agency after 4 years.  Decreasing the threshold of 
free agency would likely bring more players into the free agent market in a given year.  
The existence of better substitutes for a given free agent would lower teams’ reservation 
price of this player and, consequently, the proportion of revenues taken from high 
revenue teams would not need to be as large in order to improve competitive balance.   
Therefore, coupled with revenue-sharing, lowering the free agency threshold 
would cause some free agents to sign with low-revenue teams who otherwise would have 
signed with large-revenue teams.  For exceptional players with few good substitutes for 
their services (like Alex Rodriguez), the existence of revenue sharing would likely not 
cause them to sign with the Montreal Expos instead of, say, the Texas Rangers.   
Consequently, it is the marginal players who will be affected by this agreement.  Of 
course, being “marginal” in this sense is endogenous to the sizes of the proportion of   26
revenue taken from the high-revenue team.  As this proportion becomes larger, we 
increase the number of relatively high-quality players whom we refer to as “marginal”. 
Lastly, note that teams may find it beneficial to find creative ways of masking 
revenue sources so they do not appear as being generated by baseball sources (which we 
refer to as “masking revenue” below).  History is replete with examples of teams masking 
their revenues.  For example, Zimbalist (1994) describes how the St. Louis Cardinals 
baseball club hid its concession and parking revenue.  In 1984, a division of the 
Anheuser-Busch corporation (called the Civic Center Redevelopment Corporation) kept 
all parking and concession revenues generated by the Cardinals.  This revenue did not 
appear on the Cardinals balances sheet, making them look much poorer than the actually 
were.  If masking revenue is costly for teams, they will not do so unless the expected net 
return from masking is positive.  Revenue sharing systems increase the benefits from 
masking revenues.  However, a revenue sharing system that explicitly rewards quality 
low-revenue teams would lessen this benefit because a smaller proportion of revenue 
needs to be taken from high-revenue teams to achieve more competitive balance.  This 
sort of revenue-sharing system would make masking activity less-frequent than it 
otherwise would be.  Although this paper does not examine this phenomenon, it would be 
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Name Position Old Team New Team Years Salary* OPS RF ZR CERA 
Team 
ERA
1 Player Todd Walker  2B Chicago Cubs Chicago Cubs 1 $2,500,000  0.820 4.50 0.824
Substitute  Mark Grudzielanek  $2,500,000** 0.779 5.10 0.854
2 Player Tony Womack  2B St. Louis NY Yankees 2 $2,000,000  0.735 4.98 0.825
Substitute  Miguel Cairo $900,000** 0.763 4.94 0.795
3 Player Troy Glaus  3B Anaheim Arizona 4 $11,250,000  0.930 2.07 0.652
Substitute  Richie Sexson  4 $12,500,000  0.915 9.95 0.840
4 Player Vinny Castilla  3B Colorado Montreal 2 $3,100,000  0.867 3.08 0.781
Substitute  Tony Batista  $1,500,000** 0.728 2.65 0.767
5 Player Gary Bennett  C Milwaukee Montreal 1 $750,000  0.626 6.32 0.833 5.06 4.24
Substitute  Einar Diaz 1 $600,000  0.595 7.65 0.833 5.89 4.33
6 Player Henry Blanco  C Minnesota Chicago Cubs 2 $1,350,000  0.628 7.53 0.833 4.25 4.03
Substitute  Paul Bako   $865,000** 0.571 8.63 1.000 3.53 3.81
7 Player Damian Miller  C Oakland Milwaukee 3 $2,833,333  0.742 7.00 1.000 4.24 4.17
Substitute  Gary Bennett 1 $750,000  0.626 6.32 0.833 5.06 4.24
8 Player Mike Matheny  C St. Louis San Francisco 3 $3,500,000  0.690 7.36 1.000 3.89 3.75
Substitute  A.J. Pierzynski  $3,500,000** 0.729 6.63 1.000 4.23 4.29
9 Player Eric Young  LF Texas San Diego 1 $1,000,000  0.758 1.68 0.829
Substitute  Robert Fick  $800,000** 0.595 2.05 0.769
10 Player Jermaine Dye  RF Oakland Chicago Sox 2 $5,075,000  0.793 1.99 0.912
Substitute  Magglio Ordonez  $14,000,000** 0.836 2.37 0.897
11 Player Nomar Garciaparra  SS Chicago Cubs Chicago Cubs 1 $8,000,000  0.842 3.94 0.753
Substitute  Edgar Renteria  4 $10,000,000  0.728 4.41 0.855
Substitute  Orlando Cabrera $6,000,000** 0.689 4.39 0.838
Sources:  Free agent information and all productivity information:  ESPN.com; potential substitute list:  various internet resources including articles gathered from ESPN.com and 
mlb.com;  2004 salary information:  USAToday.com
Table 1:  2004 Selected Free Agent Position Player Signings as of 10:00 PM CST on 12/13/04 
*Salary is the average salary during the length of the contract and is not adjusted for signing bonuses.
**If a substitute was either not a free agent or had not signed elsewhere by 12/15/2004, salary is that player's 2004 salary
OPS:  On-base percentage plus slugging percentage;  RF:  Range Factor - (Put-outs plus assists)*9/innings;  ZR:  The percentage of balls fielded by a player in his "zone" as determined 
by Stats, Inc.;  CERA: Catcher's ERA - The ERA of the pitchers when the particular catcher was behind the plate;  Team ERA:  Overall Team ERA of the player's team.  All productivity 
statistics are from the 2004 baseball season for the position listed in the third column  30
Name Old Team New Team Years Salary* G SV Opp WHIP
1 Player Troy Percival Anaheim Detroit 2 $6,000,000  52 33 38 1.25
Substitute Esteban Yan   2 $1,125,000  69 7 17 1.43
2 Player Matt Mantei Arizona Boston 1 $750,000  12 4 7 2.16
Substitute Scott Williamson   $3,175,000** 28 1 2 1.01
3 Player Antonio Alfonseca Atlanta Florida 2 $2,375,000  79 0 0 1.34
Substitute Chad Fox  $1,200,000** 12 0 2 1.59
Substitute Josias Manzanillo $500,000** 26 1 4 1.64
4 Player Rudy Seanez Florida San Diego 1 $550,000  39 0 1 1.39
Substitute Antonio Osuna  $750,000** 31 0 2 1.17
5 Player Armando Benitez Florida San Francisco 3 $7,166,667  64 47 51 0.82
Substitute Robb Nen  $9,150,000**
Substitute Dustin Hermanson 2 $2,750,000  47 17 20 1.36
G:  Games Pitched;  SV:  Saves; Opp:  Save Opportunities;  WHIP:  walks and hits per nine innings pitched.  All productivity statistics are from the 2004 
season
Sources:  Free agent information and all productivity information:  ESPN.com; potential substitute list:  various internet resources including articles 
gathered from ESPN.com and mlb.com;  2004 salary information:  USAToday.com
Table 2:  2004 Selected Free Agent Reliever Signings as of 10:00 PM CST on 12/13/04 
Did Not Play in 2003 or 2004
*Salary is the average salary during the length of the contract and is not adjusted for signing bonuses.
**If a substitute was either not a free agent or had not signed elsewhere by 12/15/2004, salary is that player's 2004 salary
   31
Name Old Team New Team Years Salary* IP WHIP ERA
1 Player Russ Ortiz Atlanta Arizona 4 $8,250,000  204.2 1.51 4.13
Substitute Steve Sparks $500,000** 120.2 1.52 6.04
Substitute Casey Fossum $345,000** 142.0 1.65 6.65
Substitute Casey Daigle $300,000** 49.0 1.84 7.16
2 Player Al Leiter NY Mets Florida 1 $8,000,000  173.2 1.35 3.21
Substitute Carl Pavano $3,800,000** 222.1 1.17 3.00
Substitute Ismael Valdez $800,000** 170.0 1.48 5.19
3 Player Kris Benson NY Mets NY Mets 3 $7,500,000  200.1 1.31 4.31
Substitute Al Leiter 1 $8,000,000  173.2 1.35 3.21
4 Player Jon Lieber NY Yankees Philadelphia 3 $7,000,000  176.2 1.32 4.33
Substitute Kevin Millwood $11,000,000** 141.0 1.46 4.85
Substitute Eric Milton $9,000,000** 201.0 1.35 4.75
Substitute David Wells 2 $4,000,000  195.2 1.14 3.73
Sources:  Free agent information and all productivity information:  ESPN.com; potential substitute list:  various internet resources 
including articles gathered from ESPN.com and mlb.com;  2004 salary information:  USAToday.com
Table 3:  2004 Selected Free Agent Starter Signings as of 10:00 PM CST on 12/13/04 
*Salary is the average salary during the length of the contract and is not adjusted for signing bonuses.
**If a substitute was either not a free agent or had not signed elsewhere by 12/15/2004, salary is that player's 2004 salary
G:  Games Pitched;  IP:  Innings Pitched; WHIP:  walks and hits per nine innings pitched;  ERA:  Pitchers' ERA.  All productivity 
statistics are from the 2004 season  32
Appendix 1 
 
Equilibrium Analysis of the Free Agent Game 
 
There are four subgame perfect Nash equilibria to the free agent bargaining game.  
Below we describe each Nash equilibrium in a proposition. 
Recall that when the Nash solution is chosen, it is required for the bargaining 
outcome to give no less utility than the disagreement point from the point of view of 
either party.  Hence, we can discard the disagreement outcome in the third stage from 
consideration. 
 
Proposition 1:  A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists when team 2 bids    2
o w  such 
that 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s () > 2 w , team 1 bids    1
o w ≥ 2 w , and the player 
chooses to cooperatively bargain with team 1 in the second stage.  The player earns a 




2 1 1 2 2 2 1 , , , max ≥ >  
 
Proof:  Consider the Nash solution obtained from bargaining with team 1 in the 
second round, 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [] , 1 s ( ),  This is increasing in 
      max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [ ].  Since      max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] ≤ 2 w , we know that if 
      max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] = 2 w , then 
   
2 w ≤ 1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] , 1 s ( ) and 
      max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [ ] will never be chosen.  Hence, if the player chooses to bargain   33
with team 1 in the second round, he and the team will never disagree.  However, the level 
of       max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [ ] still plays a role in determining the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibria of this bargaining game. 
Initially suppose that       max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] is such that 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s () > 2 w .  If team 1 chooses 
     
1
o w > 1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s ( ) the player will choose to sign for    1
o w .  
However, the team would prefer that the player choose to bargain with it and receive a 
salary of 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s ( ).  Hence, team 1 has no incentive to set 
     
1
o w > 1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s ( ).  Therefore, a Nash equilibrium bid by team 1 
must be one that satisfies 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] , 1 s () ≥ 1
o w . 
Note that the argument above is for a given    2
o w  such that 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s () > 2 w .  As noted above, 
     
max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] ≤ 1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] , 1 s ( ) and 
      max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [ ] is never chosen.  However, if      2
o w > 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) it would 
seem that team 2 could possibly lower its bid sufficiently enough so that it could decrease 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s ( ) below that which team 2 could negotiate with the 
player in stage two, 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s ( ) [] , 2 s ( ).  However, if the offer of team 1 
is such that    1
o w ≥ 2 w , team 2 would still be unable to sign the player.  Hence if team 2 
lowers its offer, it would not be better off when    1
o w ≥ 2 w .  Therefore, a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium is one where team 2 bids    2
o w  such that   34
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s () > 2 w , team 1 bids    1
o w ≥ 2 w , and the player 
chooses to cooperatively bargain with team 1.  The player earns a salary of 




2 1 1 2 2 2 1 , , , max ≥ > .  Note that since there are many different 
values of  () [ ] ( ) s s w w w w r
o
1 2 2 2 1 , , , max  for different values of Pi, si, and 
      max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [ ], there is a continuum of Nash solutions that satisfy this 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 2:  A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists when team 1 chooses  1
o w  and 
team 2 chooses  2
o w  such that 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] , 1 s ( ) < 2 w   and 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s () ≥ 2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s ( ) [ ] , 2 s ( ) and the 
player chooses to bargain cooperatively with team 1 in the second stage.  Note that in 
this proposition, the player earns less than the reservation price of his next-best 
alternative.  But this salary is at least as what he could get by signing with the next-best 
team. 
 
Proof:  Suppose    2
o w  is set so      max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] is such that 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s () < 2 w .  Further suppose that 
      max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s () [ ] is set such that 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s () [] , 2 s () > 1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] , 1 s ( ).  If this were   35
the case, the player would choose to bargain with team 2 and they would agree.  Team 1 
thus has an incentive to change its offer.   
First note that since       2 w r w , 2 s () ≥ r w  then      max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [ ] ≥ r w .  
Thus it must be that 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [] , 1 s () ≥ 1 w r w , 1 s ( ).  Hence, in 
equilibrium, the player would never choose actions that would eventually pay him 
      1 w r w , 1 s () .   
However,       1 w r w , 1 s ()  still has a potential role in how team 1 chooses to change 
its initial bid given that 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s () [] , 2 s () > 1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] , 1 s ( ).   
Suppose that       1
o w > 1 w r w , 1 s ( ).  If this were the case, team 1 could choose to 
lower its initial bid to decrease 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s ( ) [ ] , 2 s ( ).  If team 1 could 
lower its bid such that       1
o w ≥ 1 w r w , 1 s ( ) and cause 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s () [] , 2 s ( ) to decrease such that 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s () ≥ 2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s ( ) [ ] , 2 s ( ), then the 
player will choose to bargain with team 1 and they will agree.  Team 2 can do no better 
by changing its offer because doing so would at most increase 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s ( ).  Note that, as before, since it does not matter what 
offer team 2 makes in this case, there is a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. 
 
Proposition 3:    A subgame perfect Nash equilibria exists where team 1 sets its initial 
bid such that    1
o w = 2 w +ε , team 2 sets  2
o w  sufficiently low that if    1
o w  were set such   36
that    1
o w < 2 w , then 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s () [] , 2 s () > 1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] , 1 s ( ) , and the player 
signs outright for team 1’s initial bid,. 
  
Proof:  If team 1 sets its bid such that      1 w r w , 1 s ( ) ≥ 1
o w  but still finds that 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s () [] , 2 s () > 1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] , 1 s ( ), then 
lowering its offer does no good.  However, in this case, team 1 could raise its offer to 
   1
o w = 2 w +ε , where ε is small and positive, causing 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s () [] , 2 s ( ) to increase such that 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s () [] , 2 s () > 2 w .  If the player chooses to bargain with team 2, 
they will not come to an agreement.  The player could thus do no better by signing with 
team 1 in the second stage for this bid and team 2 can do no better by changing its initial 
bid.  Hence, we have another continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in which the 
player signs outright for team 1’s initial bid, team 1 sets its bid such that    1
o w = 2 w + ε, 
and team 2 sets any bid sufficiently low so that if    1
o w  were set such that    1
o w < 2 w , then 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s () [] , 2 s () > 1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] , 1 s ( ). 
 
Proposition 4:  Finally note that a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium exists when team 1 
sets its initial bids such that 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s ( ) [ ] , 1 s () = 1
o w > 2 w  and the player 
chooses to sign outright with team 1 given any initial bid made by team 2 such that 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s () > 2 w .  The player thus earns w
o
1.   37
The proof of this proposition is trivial. 
Hence, there is a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in this free agent 
bargaining process that we can describe by their observed payoffs to the player.  
Summarizing, the player will be paid:  
* The free agent will sign with team 1 in the second stage for 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s ( ) when this is greater than    1
o w  and no less 
than 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s ( ) [] , 2 s ( ) (Propositions 1 and 2) 
* The free agent will sign with team 1 for its initial bid,    1
o w = 2 w +ε , when 
this is greater than all other possible wages of the player and 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s ( ) is less than 
     
2 w max 1
o w , 1 w r w , 1 s () [] , 2 s ( ) (Proposition 3) 
* The free agent will sign with team 1 for its initial bid,    1
o w , when it is equal to 
     
1 w max 2
o w , 2 w r w , 2 s () [] , 1 s () > 2 w  (Proposition 4).   
In each case, team 1 gets the player and receives B1 minus the player’s wage.  
Team 2 takes its best alternative which pays it s2. 
  
                                                 
1 By “similar revenue functions,” we mean that the revenue generated at a given amount of output by any 
two teams is similar. 
2 Perfect competitive balance occurs when any given team has a 50% of winning a game against any 
particular opponent. 
3  For simplicity, we assume that the player cares solely about the salary he will receive although many 
players find other sources of value.  For instance, Karl Malone chose to play for the Los Angeles Lakers in 
hopes that he would win a championship with them.   
4 Since a given initial bid is a wage the player could potentially be paid if he plays in the league, an initial 
bid is conceptually not the same as the player’s reservation wage.   
5 This empirical part was suggested by an anonymous referee. 